

BIOTERRORISM BORDER BY THE ANIMAL FOOD

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Abstract

Generated fears of possible deliberate use of food and water as vehicles of transmission and distribution of pathogens are fully justified. Threats of antisocial groups (terrorists, criminals, psychopaths), on the one hand, and present opportunities to turn the threats into reality, on the other hand, have sharpened concerns for the establishment of prevention and limiting the effects of chemical, biological Radioactive (depending on the agent used) on the civilian population.

Key words: bioterrorism, biological weapons, cooperation and assistance

INTRODUCION

Covering the entire planet in the dynamic globalization warrant mandatory inclusion, progressively, all countries in the system response, particularly targeting the pathogens that can be easily conveyed through the water and agricultural and food products. In underdeveloped geographical areas, with gaps in the system, the scope is "reassuring", the cases are undiagnosed or unreported, emerging issues, bacterial agents epidemiology emphasizes that food poisoning has evolved, known scenarios and measures imposed revisions and additions, according to Current trends and impact on surveillance activities, prevention and control.

After September 11, 2001, the threat of major terrorist attacks on the population of any part of the world no longer seems an unimaginable scenario.

The risk of nuclear use biological or chemical weapons is increasing, given the increasing ethnic and religious violence and human rights violations.

International treaties relating to these types of weapons not yet provide effective control measures.

Bioterrorism aggressive actions purpose is to eliminate destructive or serious impairment of health of population groups by pathogens or biologically active substances by groups or criminal organizations with international activity occult. The effects of bioterrorism to public health can be devastating.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Microrganismele most dangerous that can be used in bioterrorist attacks are: smallpox (*Variola major*), anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*), plague (*Yersinia pestis*), botulism (botulinum toxin), tularemia (*Francisella tularensis*) and haemorrhagic fevers .

They may be transmitted through several channels, of which only two are likely to reach a large number of persons:

a) **by tract**. Some organisms do not induce the disease by multiplying them, as by the action of toxins. Toxins produced by bacteria. Ingestion of toxins cause disease. This type of contamination is not considered practical .. "than agglomerations of people who have water tanks in which these toxins could be discharged. It lists. Mainly of botulinum toxin responsible for botulism, whose seriousness is linked to development and respiratory muscle paralysis;

b) **by air**. Most of the agents used in bioterrorism can be transmitted by air. They multiply, inducing the disease after a variable incubation period. Highest risk of contamination of a large number of people, thousands or even tens of thousands is dissemination during public events or sports, using aircraft of the kind that spray insecticides on crops or through the use of aerosol.

The terrorist attacks with biological agents differ from those in which chemical agents are used. The latter action immediate lethal or at least much faster than the biological, which makes them particularly effective. Manufacture and use large quantities require a minimum of technological means peak. They are more armed than the reach of terrorist groups. Armies may take protective measures against chemical weapons, using masks, coveralls, preventive medications and antidotes. In equal quantities, biological weapons are more lethal than chemical. One of the most virulent *Bacillus botulinum* toxin acts in infinitesimal quantities. The lethal dose of Botulinum toxin expressed in billionth of a gram, is 15,000 times smaller than that of VX (Nerve Agent Lethal), itself less than sarin. neurotoxic gas. Redoubtable biological weapons superiority to be able to maintain themselves their "proliferation", once launched in an environment that (this proliferation may be accelerated by genetic manipulation). They are very easy to obtain for many of them a sufficient rudimentary laboratory installed in a bathroom. Dissemination of biological substances requires no modern means, not too much ingenuity acting inhaled or ingested, they can

be easily vapor thread from a projectile launched air over a large area, a atoms or BLNI an enclosed space or, more easily introduced in drinking water distribution networks or food.

Biological weapon is an invisible weapon. It can be transported without being detected, even across borders, either in "culture" for the desired quantity or in quantities sufficient to commit a massacre. Microorganisms can be obtained without noise and without causing immediate. Can not be determined disease are not known to the agent infection CAIR / al. If it is such as smallpox, can spread easily from person to person, number of victims easily reach tens of thousands of cases.

In a paper on the issue of the war XXI century it is estimated that the release of 100 kilograms of anthrax, a night with moderate wind over a city like Washington can cover an area of 300 km ², killing up to 3,000,000 people, about how many victims would mean a nuclear missile power. Biological weapon is considered "nuclear bomb of the poor." The paper describes the effects caused by few kilograms of anthrax spreading in a city like New York: several hundred thousand deaths in the early days, thousands of the Treaty by vaccination or medication, and millions of people in panic and would need medical care. Intervention after a biological terrorist action requires the same effort, great as in the case of accidental or deliberate explosion of a nuclear missile.

Commander Chemical and Biological Defense Agency (CBDA) of the U.S. Army believes that the biological threat is only likely catastrophic effects on a exclusive forces in a theater of operations.

The threat of bioterrorism, or use of biological weapons for terrorist purposes in urban areas, is the worst in this area, there is an "accumulation" disturbing symptomatic events in the escalation of terrorism by means of "unconventional" the most spectacular remains of gas attack the sect Aum Shinrikyo sarin in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995. If you would have made use of botulinum toxin in place of sarin. under the same conditions, several thousands or tens of thousands of people would have perished. There is no "biological weapons" perfect. Vectors of infection are sensitive to antibiotics known at this time. Others, like botulinum toxin, are relatively unstable and difficult to store and kept longer.

Green Paper on Bio-Preparedness (presented by the European Commission)

This Green Paper aims to stimulate debate and launch a consultation process at European level on reduction of biological risks and improve preparedness and response (preparedness for bio ..). This consultation may lead. In 2008. To concrete actions in accordance Community competences

and the Union in preparing for biological threats concrete actions may require separate presentation and application in certain fields it applicable and therefore decision-making procedures as appropriate Impact Assessment. To improve the EU's capacity to prevent, respond to and recovering from a biological incident or deliberate criminal act, the coherence of actions in different policy sectors requires that all relevant stakeholders in Member States and European level to be consulted, the national authorities responsible for risk prevention and response, public health (the human health, animal and plant), those of customs, civil protection, law enforcement authorities, military communities, bio-industry, epidemiological and health sector, academic institutions and biological research.

The views of stakeholders on policy options and results outlined in this document are essential for assessing the Commission's mechanisms and frameworks already in place and how their implementation, identify possible shortcomings and therefore, proposing actions specific character as appropriate and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 EC. Also, stakeholders should pay attention to gaps and weaknesses, and issues requiring further improvement.

Europeans regard terrorism as one of the major challenges facing the EU today. The attacks in Madrid, London, New York and elsewhere have made clear that terrorism is a threat to all states and peoples. Terrorist groups aimed at our security, our democratic societies and values fundamental rights and freedoms of our citizens. Terrorist groups may use unconventional means such as weapons or biological materials. Some of these materials have the potential to infect thousands of people, contaminate soil, buildings and vehicles, to destroy agriculture and infect animal populations and, ultimately affect food and feed at any stage of the food chain. From a statistical viewpoint, the risk of an attack "bioterrorism" is low, but its consequences can be devastating.

Combating biological risks are based on common commitments: cooperation and assistance in disarmament and non-proliferation. In this regard, a holistic approach combining biological risk reduction Convention on biological and toxin weapons in 1972. Non-Proliferation Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and support tools in public health would provide a unique advantage. linking security with development.

Multilateral and regional level, EU aims to improve response capacity collectively boasting a biological event, including bioterrorist acts. Basically, all actions taken at various levels to predict a possible defense against biological risks and bioterorismului relevant. Several policies could be strengthened in this respect usually: improving surveillance and detection of diseases, development of border cooperation and communication,

facilitating international cooperation between laboratories, and developing international mechanisms for the dissemination of medical measures.

Such actions are applicable and could be improved further in the EU as a whole benefit when an epidemic caused by natural causes or a bioterrorist attack.

Cross-border cooperation is crucial to any effective strategy for preparedness and response. Therefore, a Europe-wide approach is necessary and appropriate, and efforts in coordinating activities to reduce biological risks and improve preparedness. This should be done also in the spirit of broader international cooperation.

EU and its Member States should work and further strengthen cooperation on preparedness in the face of biological threats in different international fora, such as structures United Nations Convention on biological and toxin weapons. Australia Group, G8, NATO, the international context, special emphasis would be placed on the development stages of recognition and detection of disease in an early stage on a global scale and better promotion of European approaches on biological risks.

CONCLUSION

Tools such as peer reviews, awareness and financial support programs should be used first, in comparison with the new legislation, taking into account that in many cases have an extensive and comprehensive legal framework, or at Community level or at national level. Existing structures and groups of experts should be used for implementation. Measures should be proportionate, affordable, sustainable and reliable in relation to the threat that attempts to diminish and trying to answer. They will take into account the impact on imports of agricultural products from developing countries and in particular the least developed. The private sector and research institutions should be involved in this process through an intensive public-private dialogue on security issues.

In terms of research, this dialogue is about to be conducted within the European Forum for Security Research and Innovation (ESRIF). It will address issues related to research and innovation in security. European sector of biotechnology and biological research to become genetically modified micro-organisms provides rules of declassification facilities and plans in transboundary context. It is understood that activities in life sciences and biotechnology are extremely diverse in terms of scope and not all applications are a threat in the context of preparing for biological threats. For example, use of biotechnological methods for producing plastics biodegradable not have the same risks as work on pathogens.

The Commission is committed to supporting the development of life sciences and biotechnology, which is a potential for the EU. The objective of this paper is to help improve security by promoting a culture of safety based on standards and best practices in this area. National authorities of Member States should provide leadership and coordination in developing and implementing a consistent approach in areas of competence, which would benefit the preparation before a biological threats across the EU.

Applying the results of this consultation and recommendations could be enhanced by a bio-European network (European Bio-Network EBN). EBN should be an advisory structure that would bring together European expertise in the field of training before a biological threats from different research sectors, public and private sectors (including security and intelligence services, civil protection authorities and first responders). Its role would be to make some recommendations on possible orientations and codes of conduct for researchers in terms of materials and resources for education on safe and effective biological standards and the most practical ones. It should promote and support the development of organic standards in the EU. The European Community has already developed tools and mechanisms for food safety and first prevent fraud. These tools could be the basis for further reducing biological risks, including bioterrorism. To be prepared to prevent bioterrorism and natural epidemics, in addition to existing instruments should be considered new approaches as appropriate.

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